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The  Naturalistic  Decision  Making  (NDM)  community  deﬁnes  intuition  as  based  on  large  numbers  of  pat-
terns  gained  through  experience,  resulting  in different  forms  of  tacit  knowledge.  This  view  contrasts
with  Fast  and  Frugal  Heuristics  (FFH)  researchers,  who  view  intuition  in  terms  of  general  purpose  heuris-
tics.  The  NDM  view  also  differs  from  the  Heuristics  and  Biases  (HB)  community,  which  sees  intuitions
as  a  source  of  bias  and  error.  Seven  suggestions  are  offered  to  assist  the  FFH  and H&B  communities  inntuition
aturalistic decision making
xperience
xpertise
acit knowledge
improving  intuitive  decision  making  and in  conducting  research  that  has  greater  potential  for application.
Rather than  trying  to help  people  analyze  which  option  to  choose,  the  NDM  community  recommends
that  intuitions  be  strengthened  by  providing  a  broader  experience  base  that  lets people  build better  tacit
knowledge,  such  as perceptual  skills  and  richer  mental  models,  as a  means  of achieving  better  decisions.
© 2015  Society  for Applied  Research  in Memory  and  Cognition.  Published  by Elsevier Inc.  This is an
open  access  article  under  the  CC  BY-NC-ND  license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/The ﬁeld of Naturalistic Decision Making (NDM) was  started
n 1989 to understand how people make decisions in applied, as
pposed to artiﬁcial laboratory settings (Klein & Hoffman, 2008).
DM researchers (e.g., Klein, Calderwood, & Clinton-Cirocco, 2010;
lein, Orasanu, Calderwood, & Zsambok, 1993) discovered that
ecision makers in natural settings relied heavily on intuition; the
esearchers subsequently searched for ways to strengthen intu-
tive decision making (Klein, 2004). Therefore, one of the goals of
his special issue, helping practitioners and theorists alike in their
ndeavor to strengthen intuition in organizational decision making,
s highly compatible with the NDM enterprise.
My intent in this article is to offer the Fast and Frugal Heuristics
FFH) community and the Heuristics and Biases (H&B) community
everal suggestions that might be useful for achieving the goal of
trengthening intuition. (See also Shan & Yang, in preparation, who
ave examined parallels and disconnects between NDM and FFH,
nd explored the potential for fusion of these two perspectives.)
However, it might also be useful to clear away some possible
erminological tangles. Dialog can be difﬁcult when we use the
ame words in different ways, and believe that we are communi-
ating effectively. Terms such as intuition, expertise, and decision
aking have somewhat different meanings for NDM, FFH, and H&B
esearchers.
∗ Tel.: +1 937 238 8281.
E-mail addresses: gary@macrocognition.com, garyrpd@yahoo.com
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jarmac.2015.07.001
211-3681/© 2015 Society for Applied Research in Memory and Cognition. Published by
reativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).by-nc-nd/4.0/).
What is meant by “intuition”? The FFH community views heuris-
tics as a basis for intuition, and sees both in a positive light (e.g.,
Gigerenzer, 2007; Gigerenzer, Todd, & The ABC Research Group,
1999; Hertwig, Hoffrage, & The ABC Research Group, 2013). These
heuristics and intuitions can be applied rapidly to yield decisions
that are almost as good as the choices obtained through laborious
analysis using algorithmic methods. Novices can take advantage
of these heuristics/intuitions. Heuristics can arise from individ-
ual learning, from social learning, and from phylogenetic learning
(Gigerenzer, Hoffrage, & Goldstein, 2008), and result in general pur-
pose tools such as Take The Best, the Recognition Heuristic, and the
others found in the adaptive toolbox.
In contrast, the NDM community views intuition as an expres-
sion of experience as people build up patterns that enable them to
rapidly size up situations and make rapid decisions without having
to compare options (Klein, 1998; Klein et al., 2010). This view of
intuition seems to ﬁt with the Chase and Simon (1973) claim that
experts need to acquire thousands of patterns (see also Shanteau,
2015). These patterns are not generic tools. They are speciﬁc accu-
mulations of direct and vicarious experiences.
Therefore, the concept of intuition is different for the FFH com-
munity than the NDM community. The FFH perspective on intuition
comes into play when the heuristics match the underlying statisti-
cal features of the situation. The NDM view comes into play when
decision makers are sufﬁciently experienced to rely on the pat-
terns they have learned. Of course, some decision makers will learn
more from the same experiences than others. But experience seems
 Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://
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o enable most people to handle challenging decision points with
easonable levels of success.
Suggestion: The FFH community might consider expanding
eyond generic heuristics to include pattern-matching processes.
or example, Garcia-Retamero and Dhami (2009) showed that two
ypes of experts, experienced burglars and experienced police ofﬁ-
ers, used the same heuristic, take-the-best, in judging whether
 residence was worth burgling; novices used a different strat-
gy, a weighted additive linear strategy.1 This study was  a ﬁne
pplication of the FFH perspective. However, an NDM perspective
ould have probed more deeply into the differences in cues used
y the burglars and the police ofﬁcers. The burglars relied on pres-
nce/absence of an alarm system but the police relied on easy access
ia ground-ﬂoor doors and windows. An NDM study would have
xamined the ways that these judgments were made. These com-
ents are not intended as criticisms of the study—after all, who can
esist a study of professional burglars? Rather, the comments are
ntended to contrast the FFH and NDM approaches.
Ease of access to a residence may  be more complicated than
oors and windows on the ground ﬂoor. And this raises the issue of
erceptual skills and tacit knowledge. For NDM researchers, intu-
tion depends heavily on tacit knowledge.
Suggestion: The FFH community might consider broadening
eyond explicit cues (e.g., presence/absence of an alarm system)
nd ﬁnding ways to incorporate tacit knowledge into the picture.
ccess to a residence might include factors like visibility (presence
f bushes and trees to mask entry), type of window and ease of
etting through, having a window slightly ajar on the second ﬂoor
ithin easy reach if the burglar is sufﬁciently tall and athletic. So
ssues of affordances enter into the assessment. Assessments are
ot only about cues; they are also about capabilities, and the inter-
ection of cues and capabilities. These are the kinds of issues that
FH might consider examining in future work.
What counts as expertise? For FFH, expertise depends on calibra-
ion with the cue structure in the environment. NDM researchers
dentify experts as having rich repertoires of patterns, being able
o make ﬁne discriminations that may  be invisible to novices, hav-
ng sophisticated mental models of how things work, and having
esilience to adapt to complex and dynamic situations. The FFH and
DM views of expertise are not incompatible.
Suggestion: The FFH community might explore more facets of
xpertise.
Are intuitions valuable? The FFH and NDM communities both
ould answer in the afﬁrmative, although they differ in what they
ean by intuitions. Both the FFH and NDM communities part ways
ith the H&B view of intuition as a source of biases and errors.
Intuition overlaps with the concept of System 1 thinking, but is
ot identical to it.) The value of the H&B perspective has been well
emonstrated in applications such as behavioral engineering, and
he H&B researchers provide a useful service in promoting skepti-
ism about undocumented claims for intuitive judgments. The H&B
iew (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) holds best when the conditions
o not exist for achieving expertise—the environment is too chaotic
nd unpredictable and/or there is little opportunity to learn from
eedback. Not all experiences support the development of exper-
ise. Kahneman and Klein (2009) and Hogarth (2001) have argued
hat intuition can only be trusted if it reﬂects repeated experience
n environments with reliable feedback. Intuition does not require
he kind of precise repetitions needed to obtain automaticity; it
equires sufﬁcient repetition to synthesize patterns and prototypes.
1 In a study with airport custom ofﬁcers as experts and a novice control group,
achur and Marinello (2013) obtained basically the same pattern: The majority of
he experts were best described by the take-the-best heuristic, whereas the majority
f  the novices were best described by an additive strategy.Fig. 1. Conditions for improving performance.
The H&B approach to intuition is generally to straitjacket it by
monitoring it carefully with System 2 analyses. Hogarth (2001)
has suggested that through a program of instruction the scientiﬁc
method could be somehow become intuitive, a suggestion that is
at variance with the NDM notion of intuition as the accumulation
of experiences.
My concern with the H&B position on the value of intuition is
that (a) it primarily draws from research with naive participants
and fails to reﬂect the advantages of experience; (b) it usually seeks
to debunk experts rather than to understand their advantages over
novices; (c) it is highly sensitive to errors and does not properly
value the beneﬁts of insights and expertise.2
Klein (2013) provides a formulation for improving performance,
shown in Fig. 1. Performance improvements depend on both reduc-
ing errors and increasing insights and expertise. I believe that the
H&B community takes an imbalanced interest in the former—in
ways to reduce errors. It shows little interest in the beneﬁts of
heuristics, and in the value of expertise and insights.
Suggestion: The H&B community might look for ways to broaden
their investigation from the left-hand downward arrow, reducing
errors, and consider the conditions under which the right-hand
arrow, increasing insights and expertise, might come into play. The
H&B community might beneﬁt from exploring the positive aspects
of expertise, and from investigating conditions under which an
excessive effort to reduce errors and activate System 2 might be
counter-productive.
What is meant by decision making? This question seems sim-
ple enough—decisions are choices from among several options. The
decision maker evaluates the options and selects one of them.
Hoffman and Yates (2005), however, have described the lim-
itations of thinking that we “make” decisions culminating in a
commitment to action. Hoffman and Yates adopt the concept of
a decision as “a commitment to a course of action that is intended
to yield results that are satisfying for speciﬁed individuals” (Yates
& Tschirhart, 2006, p. 422). They list a set of cardinal issues sur-
rounding the process of deciding. These include determining the set
of goals and needs; managing the costs of deciding; scanning the
options; envisioning nonobvious consequences; conducting trade-
offs; anticipating impediments to implementation. These different
issues will require different types of support.
Suggestion: Broaden the concept of decision making beyond the
evaluation and selection of an option.
My  own  research suggests that people with experience rarely
engage in the process of choosing among several options. Using
their intuition, the patterns they have acquired, they usually iden-
tify an effective option as the ﬁrst one they consider, based on
the pattern-recognition process (Klein et al., 2010; Klein, Wolf,
Militello, & Zsambok, 1995). Pattern matching generates an action
queue of plausible responses, options, to be considered, starting
with the most plausible. Therefore, experienced personnel often
adopt the ﬁrst course of action they consider. We  still consider
this behavior “decision making” because people encounter decision
points—places where other plausible options existed. They just do
not consciously examine these options, and we believe they do not
2 I am distinguishing between intuition and insights. Intuition depends on the
patterns a person has acquired; insight is a means of generating new patterns.
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ubconsciously examine them either. The pattern-matching short-
ircuits option generation and comparison. The FFH community has
onsidered a range of heuristics that have this feature.
Going back to a common deﬁnition of a decision as a choice
rom among several options, if one option stands out as excit-
ng and the others have clear ﬂaws, then people do not need
uch assistance. Now if we move the options closer together so
hat their strengths and weaknesses balance out, then the choice
ecomes much more difﬁcult but the consequences vanish. This
henomenon was described by Minsky (1986) as Fredkin’s para-
ox, and in the Judgment and Decision Making literature as a ﬂat
aximum (Von Winterfeldt & Edwards, 1973). If the strengths and
isadvantages of the alternative courses of action balance out, then
t does not matter much which option we select. Thus, in most cases
eople will not beneﬁt from decision supports.
The data suggest that people rarely express a need for decision
upports. Yates, Veinott, and Patalano (2003) found that undergrad-
ate students were very satisﬁed with their decision making.
Suggestion: Be cautious in advocating for types of decision
upports that work well under controlled conditions but may  be
ess beneﬁcial in natural settings. For example, Bayesian statisti-
al techniques that work well on isolated problems may  not apply
o dynamic, interactive and highly contextual tasks (Lopes, 1991;
opes & Oden, 1991). Methods that work in principle and in pris-
ine conditions need a great deal of ruggedization before they will
empt organizational decision makers—the customers for intuitive
ecision making supports.
Let us try this thought experiment. Imagine that a researcher
eveloped a pill that improved intuitive decision making. It worked
pectacularly in laboratory tests. Now the researcher would want to
arket it. But wait, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) would
sk for more testing. The researcher would need to try it out in ﬁeld
onditions. The FDA would want to know how easy it would be to
ollow the prescribed regimen. It would ask what would happen to
he effectiveness if someone failed to follow the protocol exactly.
t would want to determine the pill’s effectiveness with all kinds of
ub-groups. Just having a pill that scores well in trials is necessary
n order to start the approval process, but certainly not sufﬁcient
o end it.
Suggestion: When developing new intuitive decision support
ethods, researchers should perform studies showing that peo-
le in organizational settings have a need and also a desire for
mprovement.
. NDM approaches to strengthening intuition
This section illustrates some ways that an NDM perspective
ould try to improve intuition. For example, my  research (Klein,
998) suggests that experienced decision makers rely on pattern
etrieval and pattern matching to determine an option to pur-
ue. Their challenge is not choosing between alternative options
ut making sense of the events and conditions. They need help
ith situation awareness (Endsley, 1995) and sensemaking (Weick,
995). They readily acknowledge this need and seem motivated to
ake steps to obtain that help. In this formulation, one result of
ccelerating decision makers’ expertise by providing more infor-
ative experiences will be to produce better intuitive decision
aking (Hoffman, Feltovich, Fiore, Klein, & Ziebell, 2009; Hoffman
 Militello, 2009; Hoffman et al., 2013; Klein, 2004).
.1. Intuitions and tacit knowledgeExpertise primarily consists of tacit knowledge, rather than
xplicit knowledge of facts and similar forms of declarative knowl-
dge (Polanyi, 1958; Polanyi, 1967). What differentiates the skilledory and Cognition 4 (2015) 164–168
decision makers my colleagues and I have studied is their abil-
ity to make perceptual discriminations, to recognize patterns, to
draw on rich mental models, and to judge typicality (Klein, 2009).
These aspects of tacit knowledge are, by deﬁnition, tacit—difﬁcult
to articulate and often unavailable to consciousness. Judgments and
decisions based on these types of tacit knowledge will, therefore,
appear to be intuitive. In this NDM perspective, strengthening intu-
itions means building experiences that result in more accurate and
comprehensive tacit knowledge. Strengthening intuition means
accelerating expertise. As Kahneman and Klein (2009) stated, “a
psychology of judgment and decision making that ignores intuitive
skill is seriously blinkered” (p. 525).
Of course, experience does not automatically translate into
expertise, and we  should be careful to distinguish between the two.
Further, there is no shortage of self-proclaimed experts who are
conﬁdent in their abilities and can convince others of these abilities,
but who  do not perform better than chance (see Shanteau, 2015).
I am not claiming that experts are infallible—in fact, one indicator
of whether someone is an expert is whether that person is mulling
over his/her last error.
1.2. Acquiring tacit knowledge
Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995); von Krogh, Ichijo, and Nonaka
(2000) have written extensively about the importance of tacit
knowledge for organizations, and about methods for gaining tacit
knowledge (see also Leonard & Swap, 2005). This body of work is
probably the leading source of guidance on the topic of acquiring
tacit knowledge. In this section I will add a little to this material by
describing several of my  own experiences in trying to foster tacit
knowledge.
One approach involved the use of Tactical Decision Games
(TDGs) (Schmitt, 1994) for helping military personnel become bet-
ter decision makers. TDGs are short paper-and-pencil scenarios
that describe a situation and the resources available to the decision
maker, plus the mission, and then introduce an unexpected and
challenging twist requiring a rapid decision. TDGs are often pre-
sented in small groups, and after announcing the unexpected twist,
the facilitator typically calls on a group member to make a decision
with little time to think or analyze, just as s/he will have to in com-
bat. Part of the rationale is to prepare warﬁghters for uncertainty
and time pressure.
However, in working with TDGs over a few years, I noticed that
the scenarios that seemed richest and most effective were cre-
ated by people with domain experience. Their scenarios included
tough decisions, but also depended on seeing the affordances in
the situation—for the military that might mean innovative ways
of using terrain or equipment. I speculate that the critical learning
was about the affordances; the decision challenge was  the candy-
coating that kept people interested and engaged. The affordances
were about how things worked and how to rejigger them to make
them work more effectively.
A second approach linked TDGs to military doctrine. In one
project, we were trying to teach doctrine for tasks such as conduct-
ing an ambush or crossing a dangerous area. Doctrine is important
because it represents best practices, and because you want every-
one on your team to know the doctrine to reduce the chances of
a coordination breakdown. Typically, doctrine is taught as declar-
ative knowledge about a procedure—a description of a series of
steps to follow. Learners are expected to memorize the steps. But
our research team found a better way  to teach doctrine by using
TDGs and have the facilitator “punish” the wrong behaviors by
introducing variations that would bring home the consequences
of mistakes such as failing to post sentinels. The warﬁghters came
to understand the reasons for the doctrinal methods. Only then
would we  explain that the doctrine was  written down and give
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hem access to it. Thus, we started by building experience and by
reating emotional reactions to decisions that violated doctrine.
A third approach used TDGs to teach structural relations. In yet
nother project, my  team was collecting scenarios to turn into TDGs
o teach safety issues to Navy pilots. We  had 15–20 pilots in a class.
ne of the pilots described a night ﬂight in which he lost all electri-
al power shortly after takeoff. Somehow he managed to navigate
ack to the aircraft carrier and land his plane safely. The class pep-
ered him with questions about possible workarounds, techniques
or rebooting the system, and other ideas. Often the questioner
ould ask about a possible tactic and then break off mid-sentence,
uttering about how that really would not work because of the
ay the system was connected. By the end of the discussion, we
ll noticed that this scenario demanded detailed knowledge of the
lectrical system. The pilots agreed that they learned more about
he system than when they were shown a wiring diagram and asked
o memorize it. The TDG exercise – in this case merely a recol-
ection of a scenario that could be turned into a TDG – yielded a
unctional understanding of the electrical sub-system and its inter-
ction with hydraulics, communications, and other sub-systems.
he tacit knowledge in this case was in the form of a richer mental
odel of the electrical system in action.
A fourth approach is to rely on actual workplace experiences
o provide On-the-Job Learning. Fadde and Klein (2010) have
escribed a number of On-the-Job Learning activities that have the
otential to boost tacit knowledge. These include observing skilled
ecision makers as they performed difﬁcult tasks; experimenting
ith different strategies; engaging in after-action reviews to diag-
ose the reasons for successes and failures; soliciting coaching from
killed decision makers.
A ﬁfth approach uses a scenario-based method akin to Tactical
ecision Games. Klein, Hintze, and Saab (2013) have described a
hadowBox method for having trainees address decisions in the
idst of scenarios that are presented in paper-and-pencil for-
at; one software version runs on a tablet computer and another
oftware version is web-based and runs on laptops. Unlike TDGs,
he ShadowBox method does not rely on a facilitator. Instead, a
roup of Subject-Matter Experts read through a scenario and then
rovide their responses and the rationale behind these responses.
he trainees are given the same scenarios and are asked to ﬁll
ut their responses and rationales at speciﬁc decision points. Once
hey have provided their responses and rationales, the trainees are
hown the synthesized Subject-Matter Expert answers and asked
o identify how their answers differed from those of the experts.
he ShadowBox exercise lets the trainee see the situation through
he eyes of experts. The trainees get to notice what the experts
re noticing and thinking that is new and different—helping the
rainees to expand their own mental models. The trainees do not
ave to agree with the experts, they simply need to try to anticipate
ow the experts are going to think. A recent evaluation found that
rainees increased their match to the experts by 28% after only a
ew hours (Klein, Borders, Wright, & Newsome, 2015).
The ﬁve approaches described in this section illustrate how
 Naturalistic Decision Making approach might try to build tacit
nowledge. The approaches emphasize perceptual skills, mental
odels, and patterns acquired through experience and familiarity.
ther researchers have offered similar ideas, even researchers who
re not part of the NDM community. For example, Hogarth and
oyer (2015) advocate for providing simulated experiences to help
eople gain richer mental models and stronger intuitions about
ncertainty and forecasts.
The objective of an NDM approach is to strengthen mental mod-ls and acquire new beliefs. Behavioral approaches tend to rely on
epetitions to strengthen connections, to try to achieve automatic-
ty, whereas NDM approaches seek to provide insights and shifts in
ental models.ory and Cognition 4 (2015) 164–168 167
1.3. Unpacking mental models
From the NDM perspective, mental models are a person’s beliefs
about causal relationships. People usually cannot articulate all, or
even most of these beliefs, nor can they articulate how the different
causal relationships interact. Yet these beliefs determine how peo-
ple do mental simulations of different courses of action, to see how
they might play out. These beliefs determine whether an explana-
tion for an event is judged to be plausible. Mental models help us
understand events and anticipate possible future states and events.
How can we study a person’s mental model? Klein and Hoffman
(2008) suggest using Cognitive Task Analysis (CTA) methods
(Crandall, Klein, & Hoffman, 2006; Hoffman & Militello, 2009), and
directing the analysis at the kinds of relationships and concepts
that a person has a mental model about. Thus, to examine spatial
relationships we  can ask the person to draw a map. To capture tem-
poral relationships we  could request that the person create a script.
To capture organizational relationships the person could prepare a
wiring diagram of the people in the organizational hierarchy. To
get a picture of a person’s conceptual understanding we could use
a concept map  (Novak & Can˜as, 2006).
Yates et al. (2011) have demonstrated how it is possible to get
inside someone’s head to understand more about how the person
makes decisions. Their research strategy centers around an impor-
tant decision rather than examining expertise. In this study, the
decision was  whether to wear a seat belt. Some drivers reliably use
seat belts, others do not. At least, that is what they report. Yates
and his colleagues arranged for drivers to borrow a car that, unbe-
knownst to them, had been conﬁgured to monitor seat belt use. So
Yates et al. did not have to rely on self-report; they had actual data.
They classiﬁed the drivers into those who  always wore seatbelts,
sometimes or rarely wore them. Then they went further. Through
interviews they distinguished drivers who  had set a policy to use
seatbelts at all times; 98% of them actually used seatbelts. Other
drivers had a partial policy. Their seatbelt use depended on dis-
tance, speed, likely presence of police ofﬁcers, and other factors.
They held ﬂawed beliefs such as estimating the chance for an acci-
dent as lower for short trips than long ones. They used seatbelts 67%
of the time. A third group had no policy at all—they used seatbelts
90% of the time. Research like this provides insights into the poli-
cies people adopt plus the basis for these policies, and their impact
on behavior. They also point the way for educational interventions.
2. Conclusions
The purpose of this opinion piece is to provide a Naturalistic
Decision Making perspective on the topic of improving intuitive
decision making. The NDM view differs from both the H&B and F&F
views in several ways. NDM researchers give greater prominence to
the role of experience; they study decision making in actual con-
texts as opposed to using laboratory tasks. NDM researchers are
less interested in teaching decision strategies than in helping peo-
ple gain experience more quickly and make sense of more complex
situations by bringing to bear a richer and broader knowledge base
and conceptual base for making intuitive judgments and decisions.
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